Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.009zbMath1255.91089MaRDI QIDQ1934848

Ahmed Doghmi, Abderrahmane Ziad

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.009

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicity; unanimity; Nash implementation; no veto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B52: Special types of economic equilibria

91B12: Voting theory

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference, Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences, Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked, Double implementation without no-veto-power, Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems, Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences, On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition

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