Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.12.009MaRDI QIDQ1934848zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ahmed Doghmi, Abderrahmane Ziad

Publication date 29 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.009

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityunanimityNash implementationno veto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

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• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
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• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4091137 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation

Cited in

(11)

• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Double implementation without no-veto-power
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
• On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
• On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
• Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
• Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
• Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

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