Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.12.009zbMATH Open1255.91089OpenAlexW2032248844MaRDI QIDQ1934848FDOQ1934848

Authors: Ahmed Doghmi, Abderrahmane Ziad 

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.009

Recommendations

• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityunanimityNash implementationno veto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
• A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
• Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

Cited In (11)

• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Double implementation without no-veto-power
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
• On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
• Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
• On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
• Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
• Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
• Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

This page was built for publication: Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1934848)