A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
From MaRDI portal
This paper gives a simple proof of the following result, which is due to \textit{E. Maskin} [Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, to appear]: If an n-person social choice rule f, with \(n\geq 3\), satisfies monotonicity and no veto power, then f can be implemented in Nash equilibria.
Recommendations
Cited in
(33)- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- A new necessary condition for Nash implementation
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
- Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Divide-and-permute
- Implementation in partial equilibrium
- Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Picking the winners
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementation with partial provability
- Implementation theory
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- The scholarship assignment problem
- Strong Nash implementation and economic applications
- A new characterization of the efficiency of equilibrium with incomplete markets
- Options and equilibrium
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
This page was built for publication: A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1089233)
