Nash and epsilon-Nash implementation

DOI10.1007/S10058-025-00397-XMaRDI QIDQ7396500zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jianxin Yi

Publication date 2026

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S10058-025-00397-X

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Epsilon-Nash implementation
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
• Implementation without rationality assumptions
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals

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