Behavioral strong implementation

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01494-0MaRDI QIDQ6063107zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takashi Hayashi, Ritesh Jain, Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi

Publication date 7 November 2023

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ace-economics.fi/kuvat/dp141.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

(behavioral) group strategy-proofnessimplementationnon-rational behaviorstate-contingent choice rulesstrong equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Implementation without rationality assumptions
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Rationalizable implementation

Cites work

• (A,f): Choice with Frames¹
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• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Never choose the uniquely largest. A characterization
• Order-\(k\) rationality
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• Rationalization
• Rationalizing Choice Functions By Multiple Rationales
• Reason-based choice correspondences
• Reason-based choice: A bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects
• Revealed Preference Theory
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• When more is less: limited consideration

Cited in

(3)

• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Full surplus extraction and consideration sets
• The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view

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