Robust coalitional implementation
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Bayesian Implementation
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
- Continuous implementation
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
- Implementation under ambiguity
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Implementation via rights structures
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- On Coalition Incentive Compatibility
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
- Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
- Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems
- Robust dynamic implementation
- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
- Robustly coalition-proof incentive mechanisms for public good provision are voting mechanisms and vice versa
- Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Weak implementation
Cited in
(7)- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2204545 (Why is no real title available?)
- An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation
- Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
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