Robust coalitional implementation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.022MaRDI QIDQ2078099zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Huiyi Guo, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Publication date 25 February 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.022

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionfull implementationbelief-free implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2204545

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Bayesian Implementation
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• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
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• Robust dynamic implementation
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
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• Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
• Weak implementation

Cited in

(7)

• Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2204545 (Why is no real title available?)
• An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies

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