Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences

DOI10.1007/S00199-021-01364-7zbMATH Open1482.91061OpenAlexW3157877373MaRDI QIDQ2074044FDOQ2074044

Authors: Zhi-Wei Liu, Nicholas C. Yannelis 

Publication date: 4 February 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01364-7

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zbMATH Keywords

efficientincentive compatibilitypersuasionindividually rationalWald's maxmin preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
• Value allocation under ambiguity
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• An extensive form interpretation of the private core
• Core and equilibria under ambiguity
• A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Implementation under ambiguity
• Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
• Randomization and ambiguity aversion
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria
• Ambiguous persuasion
• On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
• Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
• Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Weak implementation
• Robust mechanisms: the curvature case

Cited In (4)

• Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion

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