Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences

DOI10.1007/S00199-021-01364-7MaRDI QIDQ2074044zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zhi-Wei Liu, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Publication date 4 February 2022

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01364-7

zbMATH Keywords

efficientincentive compatibilitypersuasionindividually rationalWald's maxmin preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

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• Weak implementation

Cited in

(4)

• Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
• Robust coalitional implementation
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion

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