Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion

DOI10.1007/S00199-021-01383-4OpenAlexW3193705384MaRDI QIDQ2074036FDOQ2074036

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Publication date: 4 February 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01383-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Conference proceedings and collections of articles (00Bxx)

Cites Work

• Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Competition in Persuasion
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Ambiguous persuasion
• Strategic Sample Selection
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity
• Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Test design under voluntary participation
• Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
• Costly miscalibration

Cited In (3)

• Testing under information manipulation
• Slow persuasion
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals

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