Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion

DOI10.1007/S00199-021-01383-4MaRDI QIDQ2074036zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 4 February 2022

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01383-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Conference proceedings and collections of articles (00Bxx)

Cites work

• Ambiguous persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Competition in persuasion
• Costly miscalibration
• Informed seller with taste heterogeneity
• Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Runs versus lemons: information disclosure and fiscal capacity
• Strategic sample selection
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Test design under voluntary participation

Cited in

(3)

• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• Testing under information manipulation
• Slow persuasion

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