Strategic sample selection

DOI10.3982/ECTA17288zbMATH Open1475.91113OpenAlexW3136778974MaRDI QIDQ5860033FDOQ5860033

Authors: Alfredo Di Tillio, Marco Ottaviani, Peter Norman Sørensen 

Publication date: 18 November 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17288

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zbMATH Keywords

design of experimentsaccuracyinformation aggregationwelfareauctionspersuasioncomparison of experimentsstrategic selectionexaminee choiceperemptory challenge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Cited In (9)

• Testing under information manipulation
• Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules
• Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence
• Evaluating sampling strategy under two criteria
• Comparing information in general monotone decision problems
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• Communication in the shadow of catastrophe
• Attributes: selective learning and influence
• Inference on Winners

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