Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105402MaRDI QIDQ2123185zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Claudia Herresthal

Publication date 8 April 2022

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/270618

zbMATH Keywords

endogenous information acquisitionmandatory vs voluntary disclosureovert vs covert information acquisitionquestionable research practicestransparencyverifiable disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Disclosure and choice
• Sequential decisions with tests
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection

Cites work

• BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
• Dynamic project selection
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Strategic sample selection
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options

Cited in

(5)

• On the harm that ignoring pretesting can cause
• Screening for experiments
• Testing under information manipulation
• Covert learning and disclosure
• Sequential decisions with tests

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