Screening for experiments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.07.009MaRDI QIDQ6148361zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daehong Min

Publication date 11 January 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionexperimentsinformation controlinformation designmechanism design without transfers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint
• Optimal contracts for experimentation
• Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing
• Sequential decisions with tests

Cites work

• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Robust incentives for information acquisition
• Simple methods for evaluating and comparing binary experiments
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(2)

• Experimentation and approval mechanisms
• Contracting with heterogeneous researchers

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