Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production
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Publication:2220923
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Cites work
- A principal-agent model of sequential testing
- Contracts and productive information gathering
- Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning
- Optimal contracts for experimentation
- Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
- Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Stationary multi-choice bandit problems.
- Strategic Experimentation
- Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
Cited in
(11)- Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning
- A note on robust procurement contracts
- Monitoring innovation
- Optimal contracts for experimentation
- Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model
- Experimentation in organizations
- Paying with information
- Screening for experiments
- Imposing commitment to rein in overconfidence in learning
- Delegating trial and error
- Rewarding success and failure: moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic experimentation
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