Delegating trial and error

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105802MaRDI QIDQ6537225zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Deniz Okat, John G. F. Nash

Publication date 14 May 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2024.105802

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentdynamic agency problemsrenegotiationtrial and error

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production
• Imposing commitment to rein in overconfidence in learning
• Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Repeated delegation

Cites work

• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Experimentation in organizations
• Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
• Optimal contracts with shirking
• Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
• Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
• Renegotiation of Sales Contracts

Cited in

(1)

• Imposing commitment to rein in overconfidence in learning

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