Optimal contracts with shirking

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDS038MaRDI QIDQ4922022zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Y. Zhu

Publication date 28 May 2013

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d9c3817b1b429561ccbe114b95c608be07308097

zbMATH Keywords

agencycontinuous-timefrequent shirkingheterogeneous discountinghidden actionshidden compensationoptimal contractsprincipal-agent problemquiet-liferenegotiationshirkingsuspension

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cited in

(23)

• A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory
• A functional limit theorem for coin tossing Markov chains
• New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting
• On the probability of default in a market with price clustering and jump risk
• Wasserstein convergence rates for random bit approximations of continuous Markov processes
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks
• Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
• Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
• A result on the Laplace transform associated with the sticky Brownian motion on an interval
• Job protection versus contracts at-will: trading-off entrenchment and shirking
• Optimal contract for machine repair and maintenance
• On first passage times of sticky reflecting diffusion processes with double exponential jumps
• Termination as an incentive device
• Dynamic regulation on innovation and adoption of green technology with information asymmetry
• General diffusion processes as limit of time-space Markov chains
• Delegating trial and error
• Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents
• Information design and reputations in the frequent-interaction limit
• Pricing and hedging for a sticky diffusion
• Optimal drift rate control and two-sided impulse control for a Brownian system with the long-run average criterion
• Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
• A dynamic model of shirking and unemployment: private saving, public debt, and optimal taxation

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