Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.09.012MaRDI QIDQ6665675zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yingjie Niu, Zhentao Zou

Publication date 17 January 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2024.09.012

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguitygroup sizemulti-agentsoverdeterminationwage compression

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

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Cites work

• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
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• Persistent private information
• Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
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• Risk, uncertainty, and option exercise
• Robust Contracts in Continuous Time
• Robust contracts with one-sided commitment
• Robust control and model misspecification
• Robust Incentives for Teams
• Robust leverage dynamics without commitment
• The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment

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