Optimal Contracts for Teams
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Recommendations
- The optimality of team contracts
- Optimal Contracts for Teams: A Note on the Results of McAfee and McMillan
- Optimal contracts
- Optimal multi-agent performance measures for team contracts
- Optimal multilateral contracts
- Optimal multilateral contracts
- Optimal contracts for experimentation
- Futures market: contractual arrangement to restrain moral hazard in teams
- Optimal contracts with contingent allocation
- A contractarian approach to Pareto efficiency in teams: a note
Cited in
(30)- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Knowledge as a public good: Efficient sharing and incentives for development effort
- Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems
- Implementing coordinated team play
- Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment
- Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior
- Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts
- The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers
- Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams
- Voluntary versus enforced team effort
- The optimality of team contracts
- Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
- On discrimination in the optimal management of teams
- A yardstick competition approach to a multi-firm regulation problem under asymmetric information
- Moral hazard and stability
- Optimal multi-agent performance measures for team contracts
- Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
- Futures market: contractual arrangement to restrain moral hazard in teams
- Mixed incentive contracts in partnerships
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841895 (Why is no real title available?)
- Optimal Contracts for Teams: A Note on the Results of McAfee and McMillan
- DEMONSTRATING WORKER QUALITY THROUGH STRATEGIC ABSENTEEISM
- Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
- Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks
- MORAL HAZARD IN REMOTE TEAMS
- Robust Incentives for Teams
- Incentives and the structure of teams
- Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents
- Network-based peer monitoring design
- Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
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