On discrimination in the optimal management of teams

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.01.006zbMATH Open1296.91227OpenAlexW2063728273MaRDI QIDQ2444697FDOQ2444697

Authors: Dunia López-Pintado, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero 

Publication date: 10 April 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.006

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zbMATH Keywords

efficiencydiscriminationmoral hazardimpartialityteam production

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Games of status and discriminatory contracts

Cited In (1)

• On efforts in teams with stereotypes

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