Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting

DOI10.1007/S11579-014-0138-9MaRDI QIDQ2351400zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jaeyoung Sung

Publication date 23 June 2015

Published in Mathematics and Financial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11579-014-0138-9

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchical contractingmoral hazardoptimal contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy
• Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
• Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies
• Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance
• Optimal multi-agent performance measures for team contracts

Cites work

• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Decentralization and collusion
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
• Optimal Contracts for Teams
• The Firm as a Communication Network
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing

Cited in

(13)

• Paying for performance and motivation crowding out
• Wages and performance-based pay:
• Performance pay and changes in U.S. labor market dynamics
• Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms
• Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance
• Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types
• Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement
• Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy
• Stochastic Dominance of Pension Plans
• Can agents be better off with pay caps?
• Contracting in hierarchical platforms
• Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies
• Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives

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