Optimal multi-agent performance measures for team contracts

DOI10.1111/J.1467-9965.2008.00352.XMaRDI QIDQ3005848zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hyeng Keun Koo, Gyoocheol Shim, Jaeyoung Sung

Publication date 9 June 2011

Published in Mathematical Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9965.2008.00352.x

zbMATH Keywords

agent problemcontinuous-time modelcontractsmany agentsmartingale methodmoral hazardperformance measureprincipalteam

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• The optimality of team contracts
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• Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents
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Cites work

• Corporate insurance and managerial incentives
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility

Cited in

(25)

• Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents
• Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
• Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation
• The optimality of team contracts
• Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
• Linked recursive preferences and optimality
• The benefits of aggregate performance metrics in the presence of career concerns
• A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF A MULTIFIRM MORAL-HAZARD ECONOMY WITH FINANCIAL MARKETS
• Optimal Contracts for Teams
• Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types
• Principal-agent problem with common agency without communication
• Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation
• Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
• Optimal Contracts for Teams: A Note on the Results of McAfee and McMillan
• Optimal contract design for effort-averse sensors
• Delegating performance evaluation
• A Mean Field Competition
• A Tale of a Principal and Many, Many Agents
• Mean–field moral hazard for optimal energy demand response management
• Principal-agent problem with multiple principals
• Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies
• Robust Incentives for Teams
• Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks
• Common shocks and relative compensation
• Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents

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