Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.04.004zbMATH Open1308.91099OpenAlexW3125172341MaRDI QIDQ459159FDOQ459159

Authors: Mehmet Barlo, Ayça Özdoğan 

Publication date: 8 October 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35548/1/MPRA_paper_35548.pdf

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• Risk-sharing CARA individuals are collectively EU
• The optimality of team contracts
• Optimal multi-agent performance measures for team contracts

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