Delegating performance evaluation

DOI10.3982/TE3570MaRDI QIDQ4991723zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Igor Letina, Shuo Liu, Nick Netzer

Publication date 3 June 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3570

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism design without moneyoptimal delegationoptimality of contestssubjective performance evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(7)

• When does centralization undermine adaptation?
• Tournament rewards and heavy tails
• The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
• Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
• Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
• Optimal tree contest design and winner-take-all
• Delegated contracting, wage compression, and quiet quitting

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