Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
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Publication:6069757
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105616zbMath1530.91223OpenAlexW4319028527MaRDI QIDQ6069757
Nick Netzer, Shuo Liu, Igor Letina
Publication date: 17 November 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105616
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Related Items (3)
Conflicts in regular networks ⋮ On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests ⋮ Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
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