Delegating performance evaluation
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Publication:4991723
DOI10.3982/TE3570zbMath1466.91162OpenAlexW2767285872MaRDI QIDQ4991723
Igor Letina, Shuo Liu, Nick Netzer
Publication date: 3 June 2021
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3570
optimal delegationmechanism design without moneysubjective performance evaluationoptimality of contests
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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