Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1782333
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.05.012zbMATH Open1396.91238OpenAlexW2604951231MaRDI QIDQ1782333FDOQ1782333
Authors: Christian Ewerhart 
Publication date: 20 September 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.012
Recommendations
- Revenue ranking of discriminatory and uniform auctions with an unknown number of bidders
- Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests
- On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests
- Optimally biased contests with draws
- The optimal allocation of prizes in two-stage contests
- Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
- On the optimal design of biased contests
- Multi-player, multi-prize, imperfectly discriminating contests
- Optimal accuracy of unbiased Tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
- Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs
Cites Work
Cited In (25)
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power
- Complete-rent-dissipation contest design
- Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests
- Three-player sequential contests with asymmetric valuations
- Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
- Optimally biased Tullock contests
- Contests with rank-order spillovers
- Complete rent dissipation in contest with power technologies
- Discriminatory power and pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the lottery blotto game
- On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests
- The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests
- Dynamic contest model with bounded rationality
- On the optimal design of biased contests
- Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
- Optimal tie-breaking rules
- Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: uniqueness and characterization
- Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
- Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players
- Optimal accuracy of unbiased Tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
- Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes
- Two-stage contests with budget constraints: an experimental study
- Biased contests for symmetric players
- Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes
- Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests
- A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis
This page was built for publication: Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1782333)
