The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102515MaRDI QIDQ2237876zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 28 October 2021

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102515

zbMATH Keywords

contest success functionendogenous entryoptimal entry fee-prize ratiouncertain number of contestants

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Contests with endogenous entry
• Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in tullock contests
• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• Large Tullock contests
• Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests

Cites work

• Contest success functions
• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• Contests with endogenous entry
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• Population uncertainty in contests
• Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
• Strategy and dynamics in contests

Cited in

(5)

• Contests with endogenous entry
• Contests with entry fees: theory and evidence
• Tullock contests reward information advantages
• ENHANCING EFFORT SUPPLY WITH PRIZE‐AUGMENTING ENTRY FEES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS
• Correction to: ``Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests

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