Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.11.002MaRDI QIDQ2437170zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger, Alexandra Schwartz, Jörg Franke

Publication date 3 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionoptimal biasrevenueexclusion principlelottery contest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
• Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
• All-Pay Contests
• Contests with endogenous discrimination
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants

Cites work

• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Contest success functions: an extension
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

Cited in

(17)

• Optimally biased contests with draws
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5824060 (Why is no real title available?)
• Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs
• How lotteries outperform auctions
• Dual sourcing with price discovery
• Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
• Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
• Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition
• Complete-rent-dissipation contest design
• Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation
• On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions
• A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests
• Sorting in iterated incumbency contests
• Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
• Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
• A tug-of-war team contest

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