Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
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Publication:2437170
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.11.002zbMATH Open1284.91174OpenAlexW3121895171MaRDI QIDQ2437170FDOQ2437170
Wolfgang Leininger, Jörg Franke, Christian Kanzow, Alexandra Schwartz
Publication date: 3 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.002
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Cites Work
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Asymmetric contests with general technologies
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
- Contest success functions: an extension
- Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
Cited In (17)
- Complete-rent-dissipation contest design
- Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition
- A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests
- Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
- Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
- A tug-of-war team contest
- Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
- Optimally biased contests with draws
- How lotteries outperform auctions
- Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
- On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions
- Sorting in iterated incumbency contests
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation
- Discrimination in contests: a survey
- Dual sourcing with price discovery
- Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs
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