Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0275-9zbMATH Open1233.91060OpenAlexW2042411007MaRDI QIDQ662274FDOQ662274

Authors: Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer 

Publication date: 22 February 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10375/1/MPRA_paper_10375.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumfair lotteriesstrategic gambling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Cites Work

• The Colonel Blotto game
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• All-Pay Contests
• A Definition of Subjective Probability
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Contest success functions
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• Closed-loop equilibrium in a multi-stage innovation race
• Increasing dominance with no efficiency effect

Cited In (6)

• Submission costs in risk-taking contests
• Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
• How lotteries outperform auctions
• A proportional rewards game: Competition among heterogeneous actors*
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Budget-constrained multi-battle contests: a new perspective and analysis

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