Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0275-9MaRDI QIDQ662274zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer

Publication date 22 February 2012

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10375/1/MPRA_paper_10375.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumfair lotteriesstrategic gambling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 140260
• Lotteries and justification
• Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology
• Payoff kinks in preferences over lotteries
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• Optimal lottery
• On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: the two player case
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5824060
• Efficient lottery design

Cites work

• A Definition of Subjective Probability
• All-Pay Contests
• Closed-loop equilibrium in a multi-stage innovation race
• Contest success functions
• Increasing dominance with no efficiency effect
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• The Colonel Blotto game
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.

Cited in

(6)

• Submission costs in risk-taking contests
• Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
• How lotteries outperform auctions
• A proportional rewards game: Competition among heterogeneous actors*
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5824060 (Why is no real title available?)
• Budget-constrained multi-battle contests: a new perspective and analysis

This page was built for publication: Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q662274)