Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction

DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0727-1zbMath1291.91084OpenAlexW2103868244MaRDI QIDQ2247959

Yosef Mealem, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date: 30 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3712.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information, Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers, Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation, Discrimination in contests: a survey

Cites Work

• How lotteries outperform auctions
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• Contests with endogenous discrimination
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies