Discrimination in contests: a survey

DOI10.1007/s10058-016-0186-0zbMath1349.91123OpenAlexW2333673179MaRDI QIDQ726620

Shmuel Nitzan, Yosef Mealem

Publication date: 12 July 2016

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0186-0

zbMATH Keywords

contest designrevenue maximizationcontest success functionlotteryall-pay-auctioncovert and head starts-discriminationdirectovert

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest ⋮ Optimal tie-breaking rules ⋮ Gaining advantage by winning contests ⋮ Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation ⋮ Competitive balance when winning breeds winners ⋮ Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction ⋮ Discrimination in contests: a survey

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Group contest success functions
• The politics of randomness
• Unfair contests
• Contest success functions: an extension
• Contest success functions
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction
• Foundations for contest success functions
• Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• Contests with endogenous discrimination
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Contest architecture
• Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• On a Class of Contest Success Functions
• Contests with Ties
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

This page was built for publication: Discrimination in contests: a survey