Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
From MaRDI portal
Publication:380874
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.04.005zbMath1274.91230OpenAlexW2001380691MaRDI QIDQ380874
Publication date: 14 November 2013
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000735?np=y
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (30)
Biased contests for symmetric players ⋮ Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case ⋮ Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts ⋮ Keep on fighting: the dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions ⋮ Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints ⋮ Head starts in dynamic tournaments? ⋮ Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps ⋮ On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders ⋮ Optimally biased contests with draws ⋮ Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information ⋮ Complete-rent-dissipation contest design ⋮ Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Analysing a built-in advantage in asymmetric darts contests using causal machine learning ⋮ Favouritism and corruption in procurement auctions ⋮ Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs ⋮ Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch ⋮ Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents ⋮ Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts ⋮ On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions ⋮ All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study ⋮ Competitive balance when winning breeds winners ⋮ Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes ⋮ A tug-of-war team contest ⋮ The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions ⋮ Private-information group contests: best-shot competition ⋮ On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests ⋮ DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY ⋮ Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts
Cites Work
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
- Stochastic orders
- Unfair contests
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
- A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
- Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
- All-Pay Contests
- Optimal Auction Design
- Asymmetric Auctions
This page was built for publication: Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
