Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.02.020MaRDI QIDQ2452991zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kohei Kawamura, Inés Moreno de Barreda

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.020

zbMATH Keywords

head startselectioncontestfavouritism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
• Biased contests for symmetric players
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• Contests with endogenous discrimination
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Cites work

• All-Pay Contests
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Rank-order tournaments and selection.
• Strategy and dynamics in contests

Cited in

(11)

• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information
• Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
• Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability
• Biased contests for symmetric players
• Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps
• On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions
• When is a talent contest not a talent contest? Sequential performance bias in expert evaluation
• Head starts in dynamic tournaments?
• On the optimal design of biased contests
• On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests

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