Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.020zbMath1292.91085OpenAlexW2071886716MaRDI QIDQ2452991

Kohei Kawamura, Inés Moreno de Barreda

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.020

zbMATH Keywords

selectioncontesthead startfavouritism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

Biased contests for symmetric players ⋮ Head starts in dynamic tournaments? ⋮ Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information ⋮ On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions ⋮ On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests ⋮ DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY ⋮ Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players

Cites Work

• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Rank-order tournaments and selection.
• All-Pay Contests
• Unnamed Item

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