Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.02.020zbMATH Open1292.91085OpenAlexW2071886716MaRDI QIDQ2452991FDOQ2452991

Authors: Kohei Kawamura, Inés Moreno de Barreda 

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.020

Recommendations

• Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
• Biased contests for symmetric players
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zbMATH Keywords

head startselectioncontestfavouritism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• All-Pay Contests
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• Rank-order tournaments and selection.
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps

Cited In (11)

• When is a talent contest not a talent contest? Sequential performance bias in expert evaluation
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps
• On the optimal design of biased contests
• Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability
• Head starts in dynamic tournaments?
• On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests
• Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
• On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions
• Biased contests for symmetric players
• Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information

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