Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability

DOI10.1111/IERE.12179MaRDI QIDQ2819280zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Publication date 28 September 2016

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171310

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationprivate informationcontest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Contests with endogenous discrimination
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information
• A theory of perceived discrimination
• The role of information in contests

Cites work

• All-Pay Contests
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents
• Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort
• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions

Cited in

(12)

• The analysis of an unfair contest model
• Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information
• Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
• Discrimination in contests: a survey
• Unfair contests
• Simple equilibria in general contests
• Symmetric mechanism design
• Biased contests for symmetric players
• Contests with endogenous discrimination
• A theory of perceived discrimination
• Complete-rent-dissipation contest design
• On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests

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