Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability
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Publication:2819280
DOI10.1111/IERE.12179zbMATH Open1404.91131OpenAlexW2498626077MaRDI QIDQ2819280FDOQ2819280
Authors: David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein 
Publication date: 28 September 2016
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171310
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
- All-Pay Contests
- Strategy and dynamics in contests
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
- Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents
- Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort
Cited In (12)
- Unfair contests
- Symmetric mechanism design
- Complete-rent-dissipation contest design
- Simple equilibria in general contests
- Contests with endogenous discrimination
- The analysis of an unfair contest model
- On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests
- Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
- Biased contests for symmetric players
- A theory of perceived discrimination
- Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information
- Discrimination in contests: a survey
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