Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0060-8MaRDI QIDQ868609zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Theofanis Tsoulouhas, Charles R. Knoeber, Anup Agrawal

Publication date 6 March 2007

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0060-8

zbMATH Keywords

CEO contractsMoral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Rank-order tournaments and selection.
• Contingent payments in selection contests
• Risk taking in selection contests
• Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents
• Firm competition and incentive pay: rent seeking at work

Cites work

• Contest success functions

Cited in

(8)

• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts
• Biased contests for symmetric players
• Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium
• A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
• Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
• Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments
• Are CEOs expected utility maximizers?

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• CEOS

This page was built for publication: Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q868609)