A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
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Publication:453463
DOI10.1007/S00712-011-0222-ZzbMATH Open1247.91096OpenAlexW2107324537WikidataQ57432360 ScholiaQ57432360MaRDI QIDQ453463FDOQ453463
Authors: Kosmas Marinakis, Theofanis Tsoulouhas 
Publication date: 27 September 2012
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2344
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Cites Work
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry
- Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents
- A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
- (In)efficient public-goods provision through contests
- Debt, Futures and Options: Optimal Price-Linked Financial Contracts under Moral Hazard and Limited Liability
- Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps
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