A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
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Cites work
- (In)efficient public-goods provision through contests
- A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps
- Debt, Futures and Options: Optimal Price-Linked Financial Contracts under Moral Hazard and Limited Liability
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry
- Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents
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