Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
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Publication:2178581
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.02.004zbMATH Open1437.91128OpenAlexW3009228864MaRDI QIDQ2178581FDOQ2178581
Authors: Lars Ehlers, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Debasis Mishra, Arunava Sen 
Publication date: 11 May 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004
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Cites Work
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Cited In (9)
- The winner‐take‐all dilemma
- A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- On the implementation of the median
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
- Random assignments and outside options
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