Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2178581
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004zbMath1437.91128OpenAlexW3009228864MaRDI QIDQ2178581
Debasis Mishra, Lars Ehlers, Arunava Sen, Dipjyoti Majumdar
Publication date: 11 May 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004
Related Items
On the implementation of the median, Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness, The winner‐take‐all dilemma, Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching, Random assignments and outside options, Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
- The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
- Efficient compromising
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- The Hausdorff metric and convergence in measure
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- Random dictatorship domains
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
- Strategy-Proof Compromises
- PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Optimal Auction Design
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- Optimal Voting Rules
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
