Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.02.004zbMATH Open1437.91128OpenAlexW3009228864MaRDI QIDQ2178581FDOQ2178581

Debasis Mishra, Lars Ehlers, Arunava Sen, Dipjyoti Majumdar

Publication date: 11 May 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingincentive compatibilitycardinal mechanism designordinal mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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Cited In (9)

• The winner‐take‐all dilemma
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
• Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
• A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
• Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
• On the implementation of the median
• Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Random assignments and outside options

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