Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.02.004MaRDI QIDQ2178581zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Debasis Mishra, Arunava Sen

Publication date 11 May 2020

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingincentive compatibilitycardinal mechanism designordinal mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cited in

(11)

• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Random assignments and outside options
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
• The winner‐take‐all dilemma
• Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
• Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
• A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
• On the implementation of the median

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