Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains

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Cites work

A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
Decomposing random mechanisms
Generalized median voter schemes and committees
Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
Maximal Flow Through a Network
Network flows. Theory, algorithms, and applications.
Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences

Cited in

(26)

Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions
Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
Decomposing random mechanisms
Random dictatorship domains
On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
Formation of committees through random voting rules
Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs
Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
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