Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2452222
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.03.008zbMATH Open1297.91063OpenAlexW2081078942MaRDI QIDQ2452222FDOQ2452222
Authors: Souvik Roy, Arunava Sen, Ton Storcken, Hans Peters 
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/0000b520-a77d-4c67-8776-e413f763284f
Recommendations
- Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
- Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
Cites Work
- Network flows. Theory, algorithms, and applications.
- Maximal Flow Through a Network
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
Cited In (26)
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
- On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
- A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
- On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions
- Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Random dictatorship domains
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Formation of committees through random voting rules
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
- The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
- Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
This page was built for publication: Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2452222)
