Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.03.008zbMath1297.91063OpenAlexW2081078942MaRDI QIDQ2452222

Ton Storcken, Arunava Sen, Souvik Roy, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/0000b520-a77d-4c67-8776-e413f763284f

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofsingle-peaked domainprobabilistic rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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