On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102912zbMath1530.91168OpenAlexW4388343578MaRDI QIDQ6146443

Chinmay Ingalagavi, Soumyarup Sadhukhan

Publication date: 5 February 2024

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102912

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesssocial choice correspondencemin-max rulessingle-peaked utility functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• Matching with single-peaked preferences
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

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