The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
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Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Voting by Committees
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Voting under constraints
Cited in
(16)- On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Random dictatorship domains
- An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Formation of committees through random voting rules
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
- The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
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