Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.09.001MaRDI QIDQ2016246zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mathijs M. de Weerdt, Paul Harrenstein, Vincent Conitzer

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesssocial choice functionindifferencestie-breakingcontract auctionweakly transferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
• Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions
• Stable marriage and indifference
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• The core of the matching game
• Topics in mathematical economics and game theory. Essays in honor of Robert J. Aumann
• Towards a mechanism for incentivating privacy

Cited in

(4)

• Dominant strategy mechanisms for contract auctions with risk aversion and moral hazard
• Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
• A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents
• Strictly strategy-proof auctions

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