Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium
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Publication:453203
DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0606-XzbMATH Open1247.91098OpenAlexW2067273131MaRDI QIDQ453203FDOQ453203
Publication date: 18 September 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273670/files/qed_wp_1193.pdf
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Cites Work
- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- The nature of tournaments
- Contest success functions
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
- Foundations for contest success functions
- Contest success functions: an extension
- Performance, promotion, and the Peter principle
- Corporate tournaments, human capital acquisition, and the firm size-wage relation
- A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
- Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
- Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
- The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data
- The Wage Policy of a Firm
- Strategic Promotion and Compensation
- Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps
Cited In (6)
- Simple equilibria in general contests
- Strategic Promotion and Compensation
- Relational contracts in a persistent environment
- Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms
- Performance, promotion, and the Peter principle
- Corporate tournaments, human capital acquisition, and the firm size-wage relation
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