Recommendations
Cites work
- A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
- Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
- Contest success functions
- Contest success functions: an extension
- Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps
- Corporate tournaments, human capital acquisition, and the firm size-wage relation
- Foundations for contest success functions
- Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
- Performance, promotion, and the Peter principle
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
- Strategic Promotion and Compensation
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data
- The Wage Policy of a Firm
- The nature of tournaments
- Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
Cited in
(9)- Simple equilibria in general contests
- Strategic Promotion and Compensation
- Retained earnings dynamic, internal promotions and Walrasian equilibrium
- Seniority bias in a tournament
- Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance
- Relational contracts in a persistent environment
- Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms
- Performance, promotion, and the Peter principle
- Corporate tournaments, human capital acquisition, and the firm size-wage relation
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