Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium
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Publication:453203
DOI10.1007/s00199-011-0606-xzbMath1247.91098OpenAlexW2067273131MaRDI QIDQ453203
Publication date: 18 September 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273670/files/qed_wp_1193.pdf
Related Items
Relational contracts in a persistent environment, Simple equilibria in general contests, Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms
Cites Work
- The nature of tournaments
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- Contest success functions
- Foundations for contest success functions
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- A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
- Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
- Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
- Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition
- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
- The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data
- The Wage Policy of a Firm
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- Strategic Promotion and Compensation
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
