Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
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Publication:4264322
DOI10.1162/003355398555531zbMath0940.91027OpenAlexW2100316976MaRDI QIDQ4264322
Daron Acemoglu, Jörn-Steffen Pischke
Publication date: 16 September 1999
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w5605.pdf
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