Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms
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Publication:516996
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.09.013zbMATH Open1394.91257OpenAlexW2529999154MaRDI QIDQ516996FDOQ516996
Authors: Simon Dato, Andreas Grunewald, Matthias Kräkel, Daniel Müller 
Publication date: 16 March 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.013
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Cites Work
- Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Market signaling with grades
- Contractual incompleteness, unemployment, and labour market segmentation
- Corporate tournaments, human capital acquisition, and the firm size-wage relation
- A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
- Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
- Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium
- The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data
- The Wage Policy of a Firm
- Strategic Promotion and Compensation
- A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms
- Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution
Cited In (6)
- A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
- Strategic Promotion and Compensation
- Employee satisfaction and asymmetric cost behavior: evidence from glassdoor
- A characterization of employment distortions in labor contracts with asymmetric information
- Asymmetric information and search frictions: a neutrality result
- Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market
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