Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.09.013MaRDI QIDQ516996zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Simon Dato, Andreas Grunewald, Matthias Kräkel, Daniel Müller

Publication date 16 March 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.013

zbMATH Keywords

invisibility hypothesispoachingpromotion-as-signal hypothesis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
• Asymmetric information and search frictions: a neutrality result
• Strategic Promotion and Compensation
• The invisibility hypothesis and promotion efficiency
• Dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information

Cites work

• A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
• A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms
• Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
• Contractual incompleteness, unemployment, and labour market segmentation
• Corporate tournaments, human capital acquisition, and the firm size-wage relation
• Market signaling with grades
• Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium
• Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Promotion and Compensation
• The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data
• The Wage Policy of a Firm
• Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution

Cited in

(6)

• A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications
• Strategic Promotion and Compensation
• Employee satisfaction and asymmetric cost behavior: evidence from glassdoor
• A characterization of employment distortions in labor contracts with asymmetric information
• Asymmetric information and search frictions: a neutrality result
• Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market

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• Z-Tree

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