Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2012-0007MaRDI QIDQ1674980zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Akhmed Akhmedov, Anton Suvorov

Publication date 26 October 2017

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0007

zbMATH Keywords

asymmertric informationcommitmentdiscretionary investmentincomplete contractsspecific human dapital

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Arm's Length Relationships
• Game theory
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Leadership, coordination, and corporate culture
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Optimal Labour Contracts when Workers have a Variety of Privately Observed Reservation Wages
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
• Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent

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