Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance
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Publication:1674980
DOI10.1515/bejte-2012-0007zbMath1375.91120OpenAlexW3122983484MaRDI QIDQ1674980
Akhmed Akhmedov, Anton Suvorov
Publication date: 26 October 2017
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0007
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