Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2012-0007zbMath1375.91120OpenAlexW3122983484MaRDI QIDQ1674980

Akhmed Akhmedov, Anton Suvorov

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0007

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractscommitmentasymmertric informationdiscretionary investmentspecific human dapital

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

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