Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts

DOI10.1007/s10058-018-0216-1zbMath1422.91298OpenAlexW2581957082MaRDI QIDQ2318139

Aner Sela, Noam Cohen, Guy Maor

Publication date: 13 August 2019

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1611.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Tullock contestsmulti-stage contestshead starts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Conflicts with momentum ⋮ Two-stage contests with preferences over style ⋮ When sabotage fails ⋮ Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in tullock contests ⋮ Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests

Cites Work

• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
• Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
• The optimal multi-stage contest
• Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps
• Contest success functions: an extension
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• Head starts in dynamic tournaments?
• Contest success functions
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Biased contests for symmetric players
• Competitive burnout: theory and experimental evidence
• Contest architecture

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