Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
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Publication:403964
DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0392-8zbMath1302.91110MaRDI QIDQ403964
Jeroen M. Swinkels, Vlad Mares
Publication date: 29 August 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0392-8
differentiation; mechanism design; asymmetric auctions; procurement; first price auctions; request for proposal; second price auctions
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions, Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids
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