Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts
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Publication:1650272
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.001zbMath1396.91271OpenAlexW2743288535MaRDI QIDQ1650272
Publication date: 3 July 2018
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.001
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Cites Work
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