A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2859537
DOI10.3982/ECTA9859zbMATH Open1274.91229OpenAlexW1901468019WikidataQ56658235 ScholiaQ56658235MaRDI QIDQ2859537FDOQ2859537
Authors: René Kirkegaard 
Publication date: 8 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9859
Recommendations
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
- Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
- Ranking auctions: a cooperative approach
- Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
- Ascending auctions with bidder asymmetries
- Mechanism design for perturbation stable combinatorial auctions
- Mechanism design for perturbation stable combinatorial auctions
- A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design
- Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders
Cited In (24)
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
- Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices
- Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
- Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
- Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
- Entry deterrence and free riding in license auctions: incumbent heterogeneity and monotonicity
- Pricing in a supply chain for auction bidding under information asymmetry
- Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Aging notions, stochastic orders, and expected utilities
- A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders
- Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
- Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
- Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
- Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
- The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes
- How noise affects effort in tournaments
- Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder
This page was built for publication: A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2859537)
