A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design

DOI10.1145/1536414.1536484zbMath1304.91083OpenAlexW2059213698MaRDI QIDQ5172745

Silvio Micali, Jing Chen

Publication date: 4 February 2015

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62861

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionscollusion-resilient auctionsimplementation in surviving strategiesplayer-knowledge benchmarksresilient mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs

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