Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.021zbMath1314.91115OpenAlexW2087268196MaRDI QIDQ2253833

Jing Chen, Silvio Micali

Publication date: 13 February 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.021

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationconservative beliefsfirst-order beliefssingle-good auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (5)

Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games ⋮ Privacy in implementation ⋮ Introduction to computer science and economic theory ⋮ Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance

Cites Work

• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Knightian decision theory. I.
• Competitive auctions
• Mechanism design with approximate valuations
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design
• A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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