Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions

DOI10.3390/G7040032zbMath1406.91163OpenAlexW2540548564MaRDI QIDQ725051

Silvio Micali, Jing Chen

Publication date: 1 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040032

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationextensive-form gamesdistinguishable dominancemutual belief of rationalitypossibilistic beliefsunrestricted combinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Epistemic game theory and logic: introduction ⋮ Epistemic reasoning about rationality and bids in auctions

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