Tight Revenue Bounds With Possibilistic Beliefs and Level-k Rationality

DOI10.3982/ECTA12563zbMath1419.91127MaRDI QIDQ4614300

Silvio Micali, Jing Chen, Rafael Pass

Publication date: 30 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationepistemic game theorysingle-good auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games, Modelling incomplete information in Boolean games using possibilistic logic, Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness, Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions, Epistemic reasoning about rationality and bids in auctions, Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance